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Excess Insider Control and Corporate Social Responsibility:
Evidence from Dual-class Firms
Abstract
We investigate the corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance of firms with a dual-class
share structure. Dual-class firms, which represent a fast-growing segment of the U.S. capital
market, violate the one-share-one vote principle by giving corporate insiders control in excess of
their economic interest in the firm. We observe a negative association of excess insider control
and firms’ CSR performance, primarily with respect to the community- and employee-related
dimensions of CSR. Extended analyses reveal that this negative association is mitigated by high
financial resource availability. Consistent with a trade-off between corporate spending on CSR or
on benefits for insiders, we also observe a negative association between CSR performance and
executive pay in dual-class firms. Taken together, these extended analyses are consistent with selfinterested behavior of entrenched insiders who, unless resources are abundant, appear to reduce
CSR activities to maintain resources available for their personal benefit. While the exposure to
risks engendered by a dual-class equity structure may be reflected in the share price, our findings
draw attention to an externality: diminished CSR performance affects not just shareholders, but all
stakeholders.
Keywords: Corporate social responsibility, dual-class, insider ownership
This research did not receive any specific grant from funding agencies in the public, commercial,
or not-for-profit sectors.
1. Introduction
We examine whether and how excess control of corporate insiders is associated with firms’
corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance. These questions are timely as CSR
increasingly receives attention from investors, customers, supply-chain partners, regulators, and
other stakeholders. For instance, the number of S&P 500 index companies providing corporate
responsibility or sustainability reports has increased from 20 percent in 2011 to over 90 percent in
2019 (G&A Institute, 2020). At the same time, dual-class equity structures, which enable excess
insider control through classes of shares with differential voting rights, are also increasingly

prominent in the U.S. capital market.1 How dual-class firms perform with respect to their CSR is
therefore an important question located at the intersection of two significant trends.
Dual class share structures typically encompass one class of shares with superior voting
rights that is held by corporate insiders and a second class of shares with inferior voting rights that
is publicly traded. In the most common arrangement, superior shares carry ten times the voting
power of regular shares and hence provide insiders with control rights considerably in excess of
their economic interest in the firm. Dual-class structures therefore present a hybrid structure that
combines the characteristics of a public firm, i.e., access to the equity market, with those of a
private firm, i.e., close control by specific individuals. Compared to single-class firms, which are
governed by the one-share-one vote principle, the effectiveness of shareholder democracy in dualclass firms is diminished. For example, in 2018, 94 percent of Snap, Inc.’s voting power resided
with Evan Spiegel and Robert Murphy even though the two co-founders only owned about 19%
of the firm’s equity. As a result, the company’s 2018 annual shareholder meeting lasted less than
three minutes and there were no proposals or questions from shareholders (Wolverton, 2018).
Similarly, at Facebook’s May 2019 shareholder meeting, 68 percent of outside shareholders voted
to separate the roles of chairman of the board and CEO, and to remove Mark Zuckerberg from the
role of chairman. However, the voting rights of insiders, including Mr. Zuckerberg, who only own
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In 2019, 22.7 percent of all IPOs in the U.S. were dual class firms, compared, for instance, to 12.2 percent in 2009;
8.6 percent in 1999, and 6.0 percent in 1989 (Ritter, 2020, Table 23). Dual-class structures are not limited to
technology firms. In addition to legacy dual-class firms, such as Ford or Hershey, dual-class firms are also common
among media firms, including News Corp., Viacom, CBS, Comcast, Cablevision, The New York Times, Scripps and
Liberty Media, and those in the apparel industry such as, Under Armour, Levi Strauss Co., Nike, and Ralph Lauren,
among other industries. In the matched sample used in this study, which excludes the financial industry, only 27.14
percent (27.82 percent) of the dual-class (single-class) firms are classified as high-tech according to the U.S.
Department of Labor’s classification of high-tech firms (Roberts and Wolf, 2018; Wolf and Terrell, 2016).
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about 18 percent of Facebook’s shares, but command a combined 70 percent of the vote, allowed
an effortless defeat of this shareholder proposal (Kozlowska, 2019).
Excess insider control and the extent of firms’ CSR activities are connected through the
type and magnitude of the agency problem prevalent in the firm. While insider ownership serves
to mitigate the classic (Type I) agency conflict between owners and managers, high levels of
insider ownership can give rise to a Type II agency conflict between inside and outside owners
(Villalonga and Amit, 2006). Due, in part, to Type II agency conflicts, in which the interests of
controlling inside and minority outside shareholders diverge, the two groups’ preferences with
respect to a firm’s CSR may differ distinctly.
Outside owners generally focus on maximizing shareholder returns and therefore should
desire CSR activities to the extent that they contribute to shareholder value. Relative to this
threshold, however, firms characterized by excess insider control may engage in higher levels of
CSR activities because entrenched insiders, who are protected from outside influences, can more
easily resist capital market demands to prioritize short-term shareholder returns over long-term
CSR activities that would benefit other stakeholders. For instance, myopic external pressure may
dictate that firms pay market wages as opposed to higher living wages to employees. In essence,
sheltered from contravening outside pressures, insiders with excess control may find it easier to
“do the right thing.”
Research indicates that entrenched insiders may also prefer higher levels of CSR
engagement because insiders with excess control are prone to self-interested behavior (Masulis et
al., 2009). These insiders may therefore increase CSR activities to manage their reputation and
image (e.g., Bebbington et al., 2008; Petrenko et al., 2016), to benefit from halo effects (Barnea
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and Rubin, 2010; Chernev and Blair, 2015), and/or to legitimize their entrenchment through
collaboration with outside stakeholders (Surroca and Tribó, 2008). The concern of self-interested
behavior is particularly salient because excess control enables insiders to significantly influence
the extent of their firm’s CSR engagement yet avoid the proportionate personal cost of such
activities (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).
On the other hand, self-interest may also prompt insiders to alternatively engage in lower
levels of CSR activities. Specifically, insiders, entrenched by virtue of their excess control, may
decrease CSR behavior because they are positioned to withstand pressure from shareholders as
well as other stakeholders, such as non-profit organizations, advocacy groups, suppliers,
customers, and employees who, ceteris paribus, would prefer higher levels of CSR activity (Kock
et al., 2012). Prior work finds evidence consistent with entrenched insiders indeed reducing CSR
spending to increase resources of the firm available for their personal benefit (Oh et al., 2017;
Seaborn et al., 2020).
Using a hand-collected sample of U.S. dual-class firms and data from CSRHub, our
primary analyses investigate whether and how excess insider control is associated with CSR
performance. To this end, we analyze the relationship between excess insider control and overall
CSR as well as the distinct CSR dimensions of communities, employees, and the environment
(Brammer and Pavelin, 2016; Fabrizi et al., 2014). In both univariate and multivariate analyses,
we find that excess insider control is associated with decreased overall CSR ratings. The
community and employee dimensions of CSR display the strongest negative association with

4

excess insider control. Contrary to Seaborn et al. (2020), we however fail to find a robust negative
relationship between excess insider control and environmental CSR performance.2
To investigate the role of self-interested behavior as a driving force behind the negative
association that we find, we next explore the impact of financial resource availability, as well as
the association between CSR performance and executive compensation, in dual-class firms. Prior
work establishes that resource availability plays an important role in firms’ CSR behavior (e.g.,
Chin et al., 2013; Sun and Gunia, 2018). We find that high levels of financial resource availability,
alternatively defined as the top decile or quartile of firms with respect to their cash and cash
equivalents, operating cash flow, and free cash flow, mitigate the negative association between
excess insider control and CSR performance. In fact, the CSR performance of dual-class firms
with the highest level of financial resources is no worse than that of firms without excess insider
control. With respect to the association between CSR performance and executive compensation,
we find that CSR performance and executive pay are negatively associated. In dual class firms,
lowered CSR performance is associated with enhanced executive compensation.
Taken together, the findings of these two additional analyses are consistent with, and lend
credence to, the possible self-interested behavior explanation suggested by Oh et al. (2017) and
Seaborn et al. (2020). Specifically, unless resources are plentiful, firms characterized by excess
insider control reduce their CSR activities more than firms without excess insider control, enabling
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We investigate possible reasons for the conflicting finding between our study and that of Seaborn et al. (2020) in
additional analyses. We observe a negative relationship between excess insider control and environmental CSR only
in the earliest two years of our sample period, which overlap with the end of Seaborn et al.’s sample period. See
Section 5.4 for details.
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the diversion of CSR spending, at least in part, toward more self-serving objectives as evidenced
by enhanced levels of executive pay.3
Finally, because “caution is…needed when interpreting findings based on the data supplied
by one CSR rating provider” (Bouton et al., 2017, p. 33), in extended analysis we also use the
MSCI ESG STATS (formerly KLD) database as an alternate data source of CSR activity. We
obtain consistent results. Moreover, we observe that excess insider control negatively affects CSR
strengths (which are reflective of proactive, generous, and future-oriented CSR activities), but not
CSR concerns (which are reflective of current CSR deficiencies related to output and
performance).
Our findings contribute to the literature in multiple ways. We put forward the first study to
comprehensively investigate the CSR performance of U.S. dual-class firms. While the number of
dual-class firms has significantly increased in the U.S. capital market in recent years, studies on
dual-class firms continue to be limited or predate the recent wave of such firms. Our results reveal
yet another consequence of the consolidation of voting control in the hands of insiders: decreased
CSR performance. The negative association we find is consistent with other evidence that isolation
from the demands of capital markets and other stakeholders enables firms to engage in less socially
responsible behavior (Oh et al., 2017; Seaborn et al., 2020).
Dual-class share structures are controversial, yet whether dual-class voting structures
should be limited is debatable. Arguably, as long as the voting structure of a firm is properly
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The perspective that entrenched will manage the firm for their personal benefit is rooted in agency theory and the
dominant explanation relied upon in prior work (e.g., Masulis et al., 2009; Oh et al., 2017; Seaborn et al., 2020). While
the totality of evidence we present is consistent with self-serving behavior, we cannot fully rule out other explanations
as we discuss in Section 5.2.
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disclosed, any increase in agency problems stemming from the dual-class share structure should
be reflected in the share price. If the holders of the inferior voting shares know what they are
buying, and the price reflects all firm-specific risk, it is not obvious that regulatory action is needed
to protect shareholder rights. The decreased CSR performance of dual-class firms we observe,
however, represents an externality. The cost of lagging CSR performance is not borne by
shareholders alone. Our findings hence represent an important additional consideration in the
ongoing debate regarding the need to curtail dual-class equity structures: for instance, by requiring
sunset provisions to limit their duration (Bebchuk and Kastiel, 2018; Jackson, 2018).
The remainder of our paper is structured as follows: Section 2 develops theory and
hypotheses; Section 3 details our sample and models; Section 4 presents primary results while
Section 5 provides additional analyses; Section 6 discusses implications and concludes.
2. Theory and Hypothesis Development
2.1 Insider ownership and agency theory
The effect of insider ownership on the extent of agency problems in the firm is unclear.
Insider ownership certainly alleviates the classic Type I agency conflict between shareholders and
managers through incentive-alignment. However, inside shareholders with a controlling interest
can also use their dominant position to run the firm for their private benefit at the cost of minority
shareholders, a Type II agency conflict (Villalonga and Amit, 2006). Consistent with these
countervailing forces, prior work has established a non-linear, U-shaped association between
insider ownership and firm value: the association is positive at low levels of ownership, becomes
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negative as insider ownership increases to a moderate range, and again turns positive at higher
levels (Morck et al., 1988; McConnell and Servaes, 1990).
These non-linear results illustrate the challenge for empirical researchers to disentangle the
two distinct consequences of insider ownership, incentive alignment and entrenchment, because
they are confounded and must be identified using only one variable: insider stock ownership.
Similar to the approach taken by Seaborn et al. (2020), our focus on excess insider control
circumvents this problem: voting rights in the hands of insiders in excess of their economic interest
solely contribute to insider entrenchment without a corresponding increase in incentive alignment.
2.2 Association between excess insider control and corporate social responsibility
The direction of the association between insider entrenchment, as a consequence of excess
insider control of the firm, and CSR performance is ambiguous. On the one hand, excess insider
control may potentially be associated with increased CSR performance. The relative immunity to
market pressures enables entrenched insiders to take a longer-term management orientation
(Feldman, 2016). For example, dual-class equity structures are associated with less emphasis on
meeting analyst forecasts, consistent with decreased pressure to cater to the demands of capital
markets (Forst et al., 2019). At the same time, dual-class firms display increased innovativeness,
in line with such firms’ substantial ability to withstand myopic market pressures to meet shortterm expectations by sacrificing long-term promising projects (Baran et al., 2019). Prior literature
finds empirical support for an association between a long-term perspective and enhanced CSR
performance (e.g., Kacperczyk, 2009; Mahoney and Thorne, 2005).
The ability of entrenched insiders to take a long-term perspective more readily may
facilitate enhanced CSR performance along multiple dimensions because many, if not most, CSR
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activities involve higher costs in the short run, but in the long run these activities are expected to
benefit the firm and society as a whole. Protected from short-term pressures, companies may invest
more in their communities, for example through enhanced support for charitable causes at the local,
national, or global level. A long-term perspective can also encourage firms with excess insider
control to invest more in their employees, for instance through fair-pay practices or the promotion
of a sustainable work-life balance. Environmental performance may also benefit from the wider
latitude of action made possible by excess control, for example by allowing management to invest
in processes which minimize energy and resource consumption, or to protect natural resources.
Whether insiders with excess control choose to emphasize any particular dimension of socially
responsible behavior for their firm is of course an idiosyncratic decision based on perceived
tradeoffs of short-term resources forgone and long-term payoffs received. Firms characterized by
excess insider control may therefore invest to a greater degree in any, or all, of these dimensions
in a manner that maximizes long-term benefits given the current costs incurred.4
Moreover, apart from entrenched insiders’ enhanced ability to take a longer-term
perspective, excess insider control may also be associated with increased CSR performance due to
corporate insiders being interested in the personal accolades that are likely to accrue to them for
doing so. Specifically, CSR activities are linked with reputation risk management (e.g.,
Bebbington et al., 2008) and company halo effects (Barnea and Rubin, 2010; Chernev and Blair,

Likely, the “mix” of CSR activities that any one firm may pursue (or, as discussed in footnote 5, may decide not to
pursue) will be strongly influenced by the firm’s industry affiliation and the competitive forces it faces. For instance,
we would expect a petrochemical company to be more concerned with the environment whereas a technology
company may be more concerned with employees’ well-being. In all of our models, we therefore control for industry
fixed effects to alleviate concerns that firms may have an enhanced focus on one dimension of CSR over another due
to their industry affiliation. We also match dual- and single-class firms on industry in our matched sample.
4
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2015). Social identity theory maintains that the self-concept of an individual is more than simply
their personal identity, but also includes their social identity (Ashforth et al., 2008; Van Dick et
al., 2004). Accordingly, insiders may use their excess control to elevate the social reputation of
their firms, and, by extension, themselves. Furthermore, socially responsible behavior may also
(1) legitimize the entrenchment of insiders by currying favor with outside stakeholders (Surroca
and Tribó, 2008), or (2) satisfy insiders’ need for attention by reinforcing their image in the public
eye (Petrenko et al., 2016).
The possibility that entrenched insiders may increase corporate CSR spending to enhance
their reputation is particularly salient because excess control enables insiders to avoid the
economic consequences of their decisions pro rata with their level of control of the firm. In singleclass firms governed by the one-share-one-vote principle, voting rights and economic rights are
proportionate. However, in our sample of dual-class firms, insiders command a median of 63.9
percent of the voting rights, but own only 20.5 percent of their firm’s equity. The consequences
are profound. If insiders in a single-class firm owning 63.9 percent of the equity—hence
commanding 63.9 percent of the vote—use their majority vote to spend $1,000,000 on CSR
activities, then 63.9 percent of the cost of this decision is borne by the insiders; in our sample,
corporate insiders would only bear 20.5 percent of the cost of this same CSR investment. Excess
insider control therefore provides for the possibility of pursuing additional CSR activities largely
at the expense of outside shareholders.
By contrast, the same diminished accountability of entrenched insiders to both shareholders
and other stakeholders may result in decreased CSR performance. Prior research finds that
publicity in traditional or social media from stakeholders, such as customers, special interest
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groups, and activists, facilitates improvements in socially responsible behavior by: (1) directly
prompting strategic change; or (2) adversely affecting the stock price and thereby increasing the
chances of an ouster of current management in a hostile takeover (e.g., Dyck and Zingales, 2002;
King and Soule, 2007; King, 2008). However, the effectiveness of each of these channels is likely
muted in the presence of excess insider control. First, Bednar et al. (2013) demonstrate that
negative media coverage is significantly less likely to cause strategic change when boards are less
independent. Because excess control allows insiders to strongly influence the election of the board
of directors, independent directors at dual-class firms tend to be relatively weak monitors (Baran
and Forst, 2015). Therefore, they may be unlikely to be swayed by negative publicity if it means
going against the preferences of the controlling owner. Second, while a low share price makes a
company more susceptible to hostile takeovers, excess insider control is considered an effective
anti-takeover mechanism (Jarrell and Poulsen, 1988; Bebchuk, 2003). In fact, Gompers et al.
(2010) refer to a dual-class share structure as “the most extreme” form of anti-takeover protection.
Corroborating a negative effect of takeover protection and less independent directors on CSR
performance, Kock et al. (2012) find that anti-takeover provisions and the presence of “non-prostakeholder” directors are associated with lower levels of environmental performance. Importantly
in this context, prior work has also emphasized that insulated, entrenched insiders, unencumbered
by internal checks (e.g., a strong, independent board) or external pressures (e.g., negative media
coverage; the market for corporate control), will engage in self-interested behavior. Consistent
with a Type II agency conflict between controlling and minority shareholders, these findings
suggest that entrenched insiders can engage in spending for their personal benefit. Specifically,
Masulis et al. (2009) find that excess insider control is positively associated with the pursuit of
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private benefits as evidenced by higher CEO compensation, increased empire-building activities,
and a decreased value of capital expenditures. As a result of such increased spending for selfserving purposes, fewer resources may be available for CSR activities, leading to lower CSR
performance. In support of this conjecture, Oh. et al. (2017) find a non-linear, U-shaped association
between insider ownership and CSR performance: incentive alignment effects at lower and higher
ranges of insider ownership increase CSR performance, while entrenchment effects, dominant in
the middle range of insider ownership, decrease CSR performance. Similarly, Seaborn et al. (2020)
find a negative association between excess insider control and environmental performance, which
they attribute to entrenched insiders reducing CSR efforts for self-serving reasons.
Thus, because the insulation of insiders from outside forces engendered by excess insider
control may arguably increase or decrease CSR performance, we hypothesize nondirectionally:
H1:

Excess insider control is associated with CSR performance.

3. Sample Selection, Variable Measurement, and Models
3.1 Sample Selection
Following Baran and Forst (2015), we construct a sample of non-financial U.S. dual-class
firms in the 2009 to 2016 period from several sources. First, we include all firms reported as dualclass firms in the Gompers et al. (2010) sample, which spans from 1995 to 2002 and identify
potential additional dual-class firms based on differences in the number of shares outstanding as
reported in the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and Compustat databases. Further
dual-class candidate firms are identified from CRSP, Thomson SDC, RiskMetrics, and Jay Ritter’s
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website.5 We then use the Security and Exchange Commission's EDGAR database to access proxy
statements (Form DEF-14A) and annual reports (Form 10-K) to verify the dual-class status of all
candidate firms preliminarily identified. These procedures yield a sample of 332 dual-class firms.
Upon merging our hand-collected dual-class firm sample with CSR data from CSRHub
and data for control variables from Compustat and CRSP, our full sample encompasses 11,035
firm-year observations. Dual-class firms comprise 8.8 percent of total firm-year observations (n =
970), which is a higher proportion than the approximate 6 percent reported by Gompers et al.
(2010), and is consistent with the growing popularity of the equity structure in recent years (Ritter,
2020, Table 23).
3.2 Measurement of dependent variables and variable of interest
Our primary analyses employ firms-level CSR ratings from CSRHub. CSRHub has been
utilized by academic researchers as a reliable data source for CSR ratings (Hughey and Sulkowski
2012; Aggarwal, 2013; Bu et al., 2013; Cruz et al., 2014; Rezaee and Tuo 2017; Westermann et
al., 2018; Arminen et al., 2018; Lin et al., 2020). CSRHub compiles data from over 600 external
sources, including ESG analysts, governments, NGOs, and other publications and lists.6 Instead of
counting strengths and concerns, as does the widely used MSCI ESG STATS (formerly KLD)
database, CSRHub maps data items into four main categories and converts them into a rating on a
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http://site.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/files/2019/06/IPOs-from-1980-2018-with-Multiple-Share-ClassesOutstanding.pdf
6
Examples of CSRHub data sources include ESG analyst data from IdealRatings, MSCI, BrandFinance, TruCost,
Thomson Reuters, Dow Jones Sustainability Indexes and ISS. Crowd and government sources include ImpactSpace,
B Analytics, As You Sow, Political Economy Research Institute, Reputation Institute, e-GGRT, and GlassDoor,
among others. Examples of NGOs and list sources include Corporate Responsibility Magazine, UN Global Compact,
World Business Council for Sustainable Development, Human Rights Campaign, World Economic Forum,
Sustainable Brands, Boston College’s Center for Corporate Citizenship, and the Committee Encouraging Corporate
Philanthropy.
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0 to 100 scale where higher numerical ratings indicate better CSR performance. To generate each
category value, individual data items are weighted based on CSRHub’s estimates of source
credibility and value. We use CSRHub as our primary source for CSR data because the potential
for “offsetting” strengths and concerns is a particular threat for our context, in which influential
insiders may have enhanced opportunities to “window dress”. However, for completeness, we
provide results using MSCI ESG STATS as an alternative source of CSR data in robustness tests
(see Section 5.3). We analyze firm CSR activity levels with respect to three different dimensions:
communities (COM), which considers a company’s commitment to the communities in which it
operates, for instance with respect to citizenship, charitable giving, and volunteerism; employees
(EMP), which relates to a company’s commitment to diversity, labor rights, treatment of unions,
compensation, benefits, training, health, and worker safety; and the environment (ENV), which
captures a company’s environmental policy, environmental reporting, waste management,
resource management, energy use, and climate change policies. We provide full descriptions of
CSR activities included in each category in Appendix 1. We average the three measures for an
overall indication of CSR performance (OVR).
We operationalize excess insider control using two methods. First, we use a dual-class
indicator variable, DC¸ which takes a value of one for firms that maintain a dual-class equity
structure, and zero otherwise. Dual-class firms maintain two or more classes of common shares
which differ with respect to their voting power. The purpose of such equity structures is to enhance
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the influence of owners of the superior class of shares, who are often founders, their families, and
management. Thus, dual-class status itself is largely an indicator that insiders have excess control.7
By examining the number of shares of each class owned by insiders, we can also precisely
calculate the extent of excess insider control. Specifically, we calculate excess insider control
(WEDGE) as the ratio of voting rights to cash flow rights held by insiders across all outstanding
classes of shares for each firm-year (Masulis et al., 2009; Jordan et al., 2014; Hettler and Forst,
2019). We collect these data from firms’ proxy statements and annual reports, and identify insiders
per the SEC’s reporting requirement and include officers and directors of the firm. The continuous
measure WEDGE provides a more precise gauge of the extent of excess insider control than the
dichotomous variable DC, and by definition equals one for single-class firms.
3.3 Models
We estimate the following model, based on those utilized by Cruz et al. (2014) and Seaborn
et al. (2020):
CSRi,t =

β0 + β1Xi,t + β2ROAi,t + β3SLACKi,t + β4SIZEi,t + β5AGEi,t + β6LEVERAGEi,t +
β7TOBINQi,t + β8VOLATILITYi,t + βhYEAR + βiINDUSTRY + ε

(1)

CSR alternatively represents OVR, COM, EMP, and ENV. X represents excess insider
control, our independent variable of interest, operationalized in some tests as DC, but
predominately as WEDGE. We control for: financial performance (ROA), calculated as net income
before extraordinary items divided by total assets, because prior studies demonstrate a relationship

7

For instance, in only 36 of our 970 dual-class firm-year observations (4 percent) are insider economic rights greater
than insider control rights, and in only 19 observations (2 percent) do insiders’ economic rights exceed control rights
by more than a one-percent difference. Hence, “benign” dual-class structures where insider economic rights exceed
their control rights by a material amount are rare.
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with CSR activity (e.g., Hasan and Habib, 2017); slack resources (SLACK), the difference between
total current assets and liabilities scaled by total assets, as these may allow firms with higher
working capital to engage in greater levels of CSR activity (Seaborn et al., 2020); firm size (SIZE),
operationalized as the natural log of total assets, because larger firms are more likely to face
scrutiny by special interests and the public and thus face greater pressures to behave in a socially
responsible manner (Cruz et al., 2014; Rindova et al., 2006; Fombrun and Shanley, 1990); AGE,
firm age proxied by the length of time a firm has been publicly listed per CRSP (Cruz et al., 2014);
leverage (LEVERAGE), calculated as the sum of current and long-term debt divided by total assets,
because a firm’s capital structure may impact its ability to undertake CSR activities (Seaborn et
al., 2020); Tobin’s Q (TOBINQ) to capture firm growth opportunities, calculated as the market
value of equity plus total debt divided by total assets (Cruz et al., 2014; Dyer and Whetten, 2006);
and the stability of a firm’s operating environment (VOLATILITY), defined as the standard
deviation of the trailing twelve months’ stock returns (Cruz et al., 2014). We further control for
year and industry fixed effects. Industry membership is determined per the forty-eight industries
identified by Fama and French (1997).
We employ the propensity score matching (PSM) procedure outlined in Armstrong et al.
(2010) and applied in prior work on dual-class firms (e.g., Masulis et al., 2009; McGuire et al.,
2014) to create a matched sample of dual- and single-class firms. To this end, we follow Masulis
et al. (2009) and derive probabilities that a firm will adopt a dual-class structure by regressing an
indicator variable for dual-class status on a set of variables predicting dual-class status identified
in Gompers et al. (2010): an indicator variable for the presence of a person’s name in the firm
name; an indicator variable for whether a firm is in the media industry; the percentile ranking of
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the IPO-year sales of the firm relative to other firms with the same IPO year; the percentile ranking
of the IPO-year profits of the firm relative to other firms with the same IPO year; the percentage
of all firms located in the firm’s core-based statistical area (CBSA) in the year prior to the firm’s
IPO; the percentage of all sales generated in the firm’s CBSA in the year prior to the firm’s IPO;
and the percentage of the firm’s sales relative to the sales of all firms in the same CBSA in the
year of its IPO.8 We also match firms on their IPO year and Fama and French (1997) industry
classification at the time of their IPO.
We estimate this regression using the universe of single- and dual-class firms for which all
necessary variables for Model (1) are available (n = 11,035).9 We then match dual- and singleclass observations on the closest probability of choosing a dual-class structure for each fiscal
year.10 Our matched sample consists of 1,474 observations.
4. Univariate and Regression Results
4.1 Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Analysis
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the matched sample. Mean CSR ratings for the
dual-class sample range from 52.143 for communities, to 52.954 for employees; the mean overall

8

For brevity, we refer the reader to Gompers et al. (2010) for the rationale for inclusion and calculation of all variables
included in our selection model. We include all variables identified in Gompers et al. (2010), except for the state antitakeover law index variable (Gompers et al., 2003), because data to construct the index are not available after 2006.
9
We find that the name, media, and sales rank at IPO variables are positively and significantly associated with dualclass choice, whereas profit rank at IPO variable displays a significant negative association (untabulated). The pseudoR2 (area under the ROC curve) is 0.39 (0.88).
10
We follow the most common design choice of accounting studies utilizing a PSM approach: one-to-one matching
without replacement (Shipman et al., 2017). We successfully match 80 percent of our dual-class firms. The remaining
incomplete matching is due to disjointed ranges of propensity scores between dual- and single-class firms in a given
year (Parsons, 2001). We assess the covariate balance, by conducting tests of differences in mean and median of all
predictor variables included in our selection model. We do not discern any statistical difference between dual- and
single-class firms included in the matched sample with respect to any of the predictor variables (untabulated).
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score is 52.549 for dual-class observations. The mean value of WEDGE for dual-class firms is
2.745, indicating that insiders’ voting rights are on average 2.745 times their cash flow rights.
Dual-class firms’ mean ROA is 2.9 percent. Dual-class firms have a mean log of total assets of
7.572, equating to a non-transformed value of $8.9 billion, are approximately twenty years old on
average, and have debt equal to 23 percent of assets.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
As shown in Table 1, the dual- and single-class firms in our matched sample are similar in
many regards; there is no statistically significant difference between firm profitability, size, or age.
The lower Tobin’s Q observed for dual-class firms is consistent with prior literature (e.g., Gompers
et al., 2010), while single-class firms in our matched sample are more highly leveraged and feature
greater slack and elevated volatility relative to dual-class firms. As an initial univariate test of our
hypothesis, we compare the means of the CSR category scores between dual-class and single-class
firms in our matched sample. Results broadly support our hypothesis. For the overall CSR
measure, and two of the three primary CSR categories, dual-class firms have significantly lower
ratings. The OVR, COM, and EMP categories are significantly lower at p < .01.11 The ENV rating
is not significantly different between dual- and single-class firms. As an additional univariate test
of Hypothesis 1, we also calculate Pearson correlations between WEDGE and the CSR categories
(untabulated). We observe negative correlation coefficients between WEDGE and the three CSR
variables OVR, COM, and EMP, each significant at p < .01; the correlation between WEDGE and
ENV is not statistically different from zero.

11

We additionally perform a univariate analysis using industry-adjusted values of our CSR dimensions across dualclass and single-class firms (untabulated). Our inferences remain unchanged.
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4.2 Multivariate Results
In Table 2, we report results of our estimation of Model (1), which examines the association
between excess insider control and overall CSR performance. Test statistics are based on standard
errors clustered at the firm level; all continuous variables are winsorized at the first and ninetyninth percentile. Column A of Table 2 presents results operationalizing excess insider control as
our dual-class status indicator variable, DC. The coefficient on DC is negative and statistically
significant (coefficient estimate = -2.44, p < .01). This indicates support for our hypothesis; on
average, dual-class firms’ CSR scores are over two points lower than those of single-class firms.
In Column B, we utilize WEDGE as our measure of excess insider control and confirm it too is
negatively associated with OVR (coefficient estimate = -0.74, p < .01). A one-standard deviation
increase in WEDGE is associated with a 0.96 points (-0.74 * 1.303) lower CSR score. To better
understand the economic significance of our WEDGE variable, Column C presents the result of
operationalizing excess insider control as the decile-ranked form of WEDGE, WEDGE_RANK.
The coefficient on WEDGE_RANK (-0.48, p < .01) implies that moving to a higher WEDGE decile
lowers the overall CSR score by approximately half a point. Hence, cumulatively, the effect of
moving from the first to the tenth decile is -4.32 points (-0.48 * 9), which represents a drop of 8
percent at the mean OVR score.
Endogeneity is often a confounding factor in archival research, and the examination of
excess insider control may be especially susceptible to this threat as it is largely an outcome of
insiders’ choices. To minimize endogeneity-induced bias, we adopt a two-stage least squares
(2SLS) approach. Following prior research, we use the seven independent variables from our
selection model as instruments (e.g., Gompers et al., 2010; McGuire et al., 2014). In the first stage,
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we regress WEDGE on these instrumental variables along with the controls from Model (1) and
confirm that all instruments are significantly associated with WEDGE at p < .01 (untabulated). We
then utilize the predicted value of WEDGE from this first-stage regression as our independent
variable of interest in the second stage (Model 1).12 Results in Column D of Table 2 indicate that
the coefficient on the predicted value of WEDGE is also negative and significant (p < .05) and that
our inferences are robust to controlling for endogeneity.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
Next, we separately examine the association of excess insider control with CSR ratings for
the CSR dimensions of communities, employees, and environment. In Table 3, Panel A, we
operationalize excess insider control with our DC indicator variable. When regressing COM and
EMP on this variable and controls, the estimated coefficient on DC is negative and significant at
p < .01. The coefficient estimates imply that COM and EMP scores are lower by approximately
2.21 and 2.65 points, respectively, for dual-class firms on average. DC is not significantly
associated with ENV. In Panel B, we investigate the effect of WEDGE on the same three
dimensions of CSR and observe comparable results; WEDGE is negatively associated with COM
and EMP (p < .01) but not associated with ENV. We conclude that excess insider control tends to
reduce socially responsible behavior that impacts communities and employees, but not the
environment.13
12

Following Larcker and Rusticus (2010, p. 192), we fail to reject the appropriateness of our instruments using the R2
over-identification test.
13
As a robustness test (untabulated), we alternatively operationalize WEDGE as the difference between insider voting
and cash flow rights (e.g., Gompers et al., 2010; Seaborn et al., 2020). All inferences remain unchanged across our
four dependent variables (OVR, COM, EMP, ENV); results are generally stronger than those obtained using our
primary measure, the ratio form of WEDGE. We also re-run our analyses in Tables 2 and 3 with a modified version
of Model (1) in which we replace ROA with the trailing five-year (as available) average of ROA, following Seaborn
et al. (2020). All significant results continue to hold at identical levels (untabulated).
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[Insert Table 3 about here]
5. Additional Analyses
5.1 Moderating role of financial resource abundance
Companies, including those characterized by excess insider control, may reduce CSR
activities for numerous reasons. While we find consistent evidence that firms characterized by
excess insider control have lower CSR performance compared to firms without excess insider
control, empirically pinpointing the exact reason for this observation is difficult. To examine the
plausibility of a self-serving behavior explanation suggested by agency theory, the dominant
theory relied upon in previous studies (Oh et al., 2017; Seaborn et al., 2020), we investigate the
moderating role of financial abundance on the association between CSR performance and
executive compensation.
A growing stream of research finds that resource availability and operating performance
play a large role in determining CSR behavior. Sun and Gunia (2018) analyze an exogenous shock
to firm resources and observe a positive association between higher levels of firm economic
resources and CSR performance. Prior studies also find that strong current or past financial
performance is associated with higher levels of CSR activities (e.g., McGuire et al., 1988; Preston
and O’Bannon, 1997; Clarkson et al., 2011; Hasan and Habib, 2017). If self-interested behavior at
least partially explains the negative association between excess insider control and CSR
performance, we would expect that entrenched insiders will prioritize pecuniary benefits of control
over CSR spending and magnanimously “give back” to society only when their firms have
financial resources plentiful enough to support both their private benefits of control and CSR
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activities. However, if financial resources are abundant, insiders may acquiesce, not only because
their refusal would be more difficult to justify, but also because they stand to benefit from the
accolades stemming from socially responsible behavior (e.g., Barnea and Rubin, 2010; Chin et al.,
2013; Petrenko et al., 2016). Chin et al. (2013) provide specific evidence for this conjecture by
finding that the negative association between a conservative political affiliation and CSR
performance is substantially lessened when financial resources are abundant.
In the vein of Chin et al. (2013), we hence explore the impact of plentiful financial
resources on the relationship between excess insider control and CSR performance. We consider
three measures of resource availability: cash and cash equivalents scaled by total assets (CCE),
operating cash flow scaled by total assets (OCF), and free cash flow scaled by total assets (FCF),
where free cash flow is defined as operating cash flow less capital expenditures. To capture the
abundance of resources, we create two sets of indicator variables taking a value of one, and zero
otherwise, for observations in the top quartile (decile) for each of the metrics. We then perform six
OLS regressions with firm-clustered standard errors, regressing OVR on WEDGE, the abundance
indicator, an interaction of the two, and controls from Model (1). Results are tabulated in Table 4.
[Insert Table 4 about here]
We observe a negative and significant main effect of WEDGE on CSR performance across
all models, consistent with our primary results, and positive and significant coefficients on the
interaction terms of WEDGE and our measures of financial resource abundance for five of our six
model specifications in Columns A through F (only the coefficient on the interaction of WEDGE
and the indicator for the top quartile of FCF is not significant). Moreover, partial F-tests
(untabulated) indicate that the sum of the coefficients on WEDGE and each significant interaction
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term is not significantly different from zero. Thus, for firms with high levels of financial resources
the negative impact of excess insider control on CSR is neutralized. In economic terms, the impact
of WEDGE on CSR performance is effectively offset; the average CSR performance of dual-class
firms with high financial resource availability is no different than the average single class firm.14
These results indicate that financial resource availability moderates the negative effect of
excess insider control on CSR behavior. While excess insider control is associated with lower CSR
performance on average, as financial resources increase, this negative relationship becomes
weaker (indeed, to the point of statistical and economic insignificance). In other words, the
negative association we find is driven by firms without abundant financial resources, which is of
course the “normal” condition, comprising, depending on our specification, 75 to 90 percent of
firm-year observations. This finding is consistent with a self-serving behavior explanation: when
insiders’ pecuniary interests and the funding of CSR activities are likely to compete, firms
characterized by excess insider control will cut back CSR activities more than firms without excess
insider control.
5.2 CSR performance and executive compensation in the presence of excess insider control
The inference from the analysis above that entrenched insiders may reduce CSR activities
to increase resources available for their personal financial benefit is consistent with Masulis et al.
(2009) who provide evidence that insiders with excess control manage the firm for their own

14

As an additional test we also estimate a changes model and find confirmatory evidence. Specifically, we regress the
change in OVR on an indicator variable taking a value of one for observations that have moved into a high financial
resources category, a dual-class firm indicator dummy, an interaction of these two variables, and controls (in change
specification). We find that for dual-class firm changes into the high operating cash flows decile, OCF_TDEC, and
high free cash flow decile, FCF_TDEC, are associated with significantly higher OVR scores, i.e., the coefficient on
the interaction term is significant, each at p < .10. We thank the associate editor for this suggestion.
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benefit through higher executive pay as well as empire building. Furthermore, Oh et al. (2017) and
Seaborn et al. (2020) interpret their findings regarding reduced overall CSR and environmental
performance, respectively, as evidence that entrenched insiders reduce CSR to benefit personally
at the expense of outside stakeholders. Notably, however, neither study empirically tests this
assertion.
If insiders with excess control decrease CSR spending to enhance their financial benefits
of control, we would expect a negative association between CSR performance and executive
compensation. While there are innumerable ways to redirect spending in a self-serving fashion that
ostensibly would otherwise be earmarked for CSR activities, we follow Masulis et al. (2009) and
focus on total compensation, sourced from ExecuComp. After merging our dual-class firm sample
with ExecuComp, 811 usable observations remain.
In untabulated multivariate analyses, we regress total compensation on the overall CSR
score (OVR) and controls. Operationalizing total compensation either as that of the CEO or as that
of the five highest paid executive positions at the firm, we find a negative association of total
compensation and OVR for both specifications (p < .05). Dual-class firms with lower CSR
performance pay their CEO individually, and the top five executive positions collectively, higher
compensation. In addition, we observe a negative and significant interaction term of
WEDGExOVR, indicating that excess insider control exacerbates the negative relationship between
CSR performance total compensation. The more severe the Type II agency problem, the stronger
the association between lower CSR ratings and higher insider compensation (results available upon
request).
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Our additional analyses presented in this and the prior section suggest that entrenched
insiders’ self-serving decisions are a plausible explanation for the negative association between
excess insider control and CSR performance we observe. However, as we examine correlation, not
causation, we cannot unambiguously conclude that firms with excess insider control redirect
spending from CSR activities to top management pay. Likewise, we cannot rule out at least a
partial role of other competing explanations for our findings, including, for instance, philosophical
disagreement with CSR activities, a preference for traditional business practices, and/or real
earnings management.15 We do, however, note the general consistency of our results in sections
5.1 and 5.2 with a rent extraction explanation which prior work, albeit without providing empirical
evidence, has relied upon to explain similar findings.
5.3 Alternative Measure of CSR Performance
Huang and Watson (2015) find MSCI ESG STATS to be the most utilized CSR dataset in
accounting (and other) literature. As CSR ratings from different sources have shown a “worrisome
degree of disagreement” (Huang and Watson, 2015, p. 4), a concern echoed by Chatterji et al.
(2016), we acknowledge the prominence of the MSCI ESG STATS dataset and test the robustness
of our results to the use of its CSR ratings. In addition, by examining the effects of excess insider
control on CSR strengths, which tend to be forward looking and strategic in nature, versus CSR
concerns, which are more closely related to shortcomings of the current performance, we may be
able to shed light on which types of CSR activities, on average, are reduced in firms characterized

15

However, the literature finds that U.S. dual-class firms typically engage in significantly less earnings management
than single-class firms (e.g., Chen, 2008; Nguyen and Xu, 2010; Lobanova et al., 2019). More generally, prior research
also finds that takeover protection, of which dual-class firms are “the most extreme” form (Gompers et al., 2010), is
associated with less earnings management (e.g., Zhao et al., 2012). Entrenchment shelters corporate insiders from
market demands, and hence diminishes their incentives, or pressures, to manage earnings.
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by excess insider control. To do so, we create a matched sample of dual- and single-class firms
covered in MSCI ESG STATS (n = 1,524) using the procedure detailed earlier. We calculate our
dependent variables CSR strengths (STR), CSR concerns (CON), and the difference between STR
and CON (NET) by summing the number of strengths and concerns reported by MSCI ESG STATS
across the CSR dimensions utilized in our primary analyses.16 Because the number of strength and
concern categories in each CSR dimension changes over the period covered by our panel data, our
dependent variables reflect the adjustment procedure of Deng et al. (2013).
[Insert Table 5 about here]
Results, tabulated in Table 5, support our conclusions drawn from CSRHub data. In line
with our primary analyses, in Panel A (Panel B) we observe negative coefficients when regressing
STR and NET on DC (WEDGE), which are statistically significant at p < .01 (p < .05), respectively.
We fail to find a significant association with our measure of excess insider control and CON in
either Panel A or Panel B of Table 5. These findings reinforce the assertion that excess insider
control is associated with poorer CSR performance. That we obtain similar results using an
alternative measure of CSR performance is especially meaningful since there is an apparent lack
of agreement regarding CSR measures from different data providers (e.g., Chatterji et al., 2016,
Bouten et al., 2017).

16

Specifically, we consider the strengths and concerns in the MSCI ESG STATS categories of communities,
employees (along with diversity), and environment. STR (CON) represents the total number of strengths (concerns)
summed across these dimensions in total. Examples of MSCI ESG STATS strengths include, for instance,
participating in notable community engagement, proactively investing in resource conservation, and offering
competitive benefit packages and performance incentives to employees. By contrast, examples of concerns include a
history of controversies with communities in which it does business, paying substantial fines due to non-compliance
with environmental regulations, and resisting improved work practices and union organizing efforts (MSCI, 2015).
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Our finding of decreased CSR strengths, which are typically tied to “proactive” and
“generous” (MSCI, 2015) behavior, without an accompanying increase in CSR concerns, suggests
that the reduction in firms’ CSR ratings we observe from CSRHub scores does not result from
insiders scaling back all CSR activities, but rather selectively reducing future-oriented, strategic
CSR activities tied to CSR strengths. While not going “above and beyond,” as evidenced by a
reduction of forward-looking CSR activities, insiders entrenched through excess control appear to
be mindful to not cut back too much and hence violate minimum acceptable standards of behavior
in a way that would trigger CSR concerns, which tend to be focused on current output and
performance. This differential impact of excess insider control on CSR activities may also be seen
as consistent with self-interested behavior whereby entrenched insiders avoid generating CSR
concerns, which could potentially impair their personal reputation, but are inclined to reduce
proactive CSR behavior as a strategic cost-saving move.
5.4 Reconciliation of results with Seaborn et al. (2020)
Seaborn et al. (2020) document a negative relationship between excess insider control and
the environment dimension of CSR using data from the ASSET4 database, while we fail to observe
a significant association in either a univariate or multivariate setting using data from CSRHub. We
conduct a number of tests with a goal of reconciling the divergent results. We begin by noting the
different sample periods used in Seaborn et al.’s study (2006-2010) and ours (2009-2016). When
estimating Model (1) with ENV as the dependent variable only for the overlapping subsample of
2009 and 2010, results (untabulated) indicate a negative and significant coefficient on WEDGE
(coefficient estimate = -1.685, p = 0.05). We therefore confirm Seaborn et al.’s (2020) finding of
a negative association between excess insider control and environmental performance for the two
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years that our samples overlap. However, further untabulated multivariate tests fail to discern a
significant relationship between WEDGE and ENV in the 2011-2016 period.
Additional analyses reveal that: (1) the number of firms covered in CSRHub, relative to
ASSET4, increased significantly in 2010; (2) the mean ENV score does not statistically change for
dual-class firms in our sample between 2009 and 2010; and (3) the mean ENV score of single-class
firms first appearing in CSRHub in 2010 is nearly 20 percent lower than the mean score of 2009
single-class firms. Accordingly, a significant increase in firm coverage in the CSRHub database
post-2009 appears to be responsible for the difference between our results and those of Seaborn et
al. (2020). This expansion added a substantial number of single-class firms with significantly
worse environmental ratings than firms covered in prior years and a narrowing of differences
between dual- and single-class firms’ ENV scores after 2009.
6. Conclusion
Equity structures that enable insiders to exert voting control in excess of their economic
interest are growing in prominence. As a consequence, the fundamental tenet of shareholder
democracy, the one-share-one vote principle, which ensures that control of the firm is
proportionate to the economic interest in it, appears to be losing ground. We comprehensively
examine a further consequence of diminished shareholder democracy that has not garnered much
attention to date: whether and how excess insider control affects firms’ CSR performance. Given
the strong growth both of firms with equity structures enabling excess control and of interest in
CSR, this is a topic of considerable relevance.
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A priori, the direction of the association of excess insider control and firms’ CSR
performance is ambiguous. The entrenchment and insulation from outside pressures instilled by
excess control may enable corporate insiders to engage in either more, or fewer, CSR activities. In
a hand-collected sample of U.S. dual-class firms, we find that firms have a poorer record of CSR
performance when insiders possess voting rights in excess of their economic interest in the firm.
Specifically, as excess insider control increases, firms’ average CSR scores, as well as the scores
for the CSR dimensions of communities and employees, decline. These negative associations
appear to be driven by a reduction in proactive, generous, and forward-looking CSR activities that
constitute CSR strengths, rather than an increase in CSR concerns that would indicate issues with
current output and performance.
Oh et al. (2017) and Seaborn et al. (2020) propose entrenched insiders may underinvest in
CSR to increase the amount of firm resources available for their personal benefit. We conduct two
additional analyses to examine the validity of this argument. First, we find that firms characterized
by excess insider control decrease CSR activities unless financial resources are abundant. For firms
with the highest levels of financial resource availability, the negative effect of excess control on
CSR performance is mitigated. Second, we find a negative association between top management
pay and CSR performance in dual-class firms. This association becomes increasingly negative in
insiders’ excess control, indicating that the greater the severity of Type II agency problems, the
more insiders appear to personally benefit at the expense of reduced CSR activities. Taken
together, these two tests suggest a pattern whereby entrenched insiders reduce CSR activities to
increase funds available for perquisite spending, unless resources are so abundant as to not
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necessitate such a trade-off. These analyses are consistent with the notion that self-interested
behavior, at least in part, is responsible for the decreased CSR performance we observe.
Whether dual-class structures are positive or negative overall is an issue of much debate
(Howell, 2017). While higher agency costs are undeniably a negative byproduct of dual-class
structures, such equity structures may be appropriate and value-enhancing for some firms in some
circumstances. Importantly, however, the decreased CSR performance of firms characterized by
excess insider control represents an externality affecting not just minority shareholders, whose
exposure to risks engendered by a dual-class equity structure may be priced, but stakeholders at
large.
By way of example, Facebook, unquestionably a firm with a large societal impact, has
faced significant pressure by its users and other stakeholders with respect to its handling of privacy
concerns and the dissemination of objectionable content, where the public appears to be torn
between demands to censor misinformation on the one hand, but also not to encroach upon freedom
of expression on the other. Despite only owning a minority of shares, their majority vote gives
Facebook insiders, including its Chairman and CEO Mark Zuckerberg, virtually sole discretion
how to balance these delicate questions. Because the influence of outside shareholders, which is
essential for effective self-regulation, is muted, calls to address the perceived negative impacts of
Facebook’s policies on society through governmental regulation have increased.
In this context, it is notable that excess insider control undercuts the effectiveness of
regulatory approaches that rely on shareholders’ ability to act on disclosures to affect corporate
behavior by means of their vote. Disclosure-based regulatory approaches are generally
economically efficient and avoid costs associated with “one size fits all” direct intervention and
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control. However, regulatory mechanisms which rely on disclosures, such as, for instance,
shareholder say-on-pay introduced by the 2010 Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act, depend crucially on the ability of shareholders to act on the information (Kimbro
and Xu, 2016). Yet this is not the case when voting control is concentrated in the hands of dominant
corporate insiders (Mukhopadhyay and Shivakumar, 2020). Decisions that are made with a
majority of the vote, when some votes count ten-fold, arguably constitute a sham democratic
process, and increase the need for more intrusive regulatory regimes to achieve public policy
objectives.
Short of prohibiting dual-class share structures, or forcing them to sunset after a period of
time, it is however possible to conceive of regulatory approaches where for certain decisions,
deemed fundamental to protect the economic interests of outside shareholders, other significant
stakeholders, or the community at large, the affirmation by a majority of the economic interest,
rather than a majority of the vote, might be required. As the number of firms characterized by
excess insider control increases, the ability to rely on shareholder democracy as a mechanism to
influence corporate actions, including optimal levels of socially responsible behavior, in any event,
decreases.
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Appendix
Definitions of CSRHub CSR Dimensions
CSR Dimension

Description

Covers the company’s commitment and effectiveness within the local, national, and
global community in which it does business. It reflects a company’s citizenship,
charitable giving, and volunteerism. This category covers the company’s human
rights record and treatment of its supply chain. It also covers the environmental and
social impacts of the company’s products and services, and the development of
sustainable products, processes, and technologies.
Employees
Includes disclosure of policies, programs, and performance in diversity, labor
relations and labor rights, compensation, benefits, and employee training, and
health and safety. The evaluation focuses on the quality of policies and programs,
compliance with national laws and regulations, and proactive management
initiatives. The category includes evaluation of inclusive diversity policies, fair
treatment of all employees, robust diversity (EEO-1) programs and training,
disclosure of workforce diversity data, strong labor codes (addressing the core ILO
standards), comprehensive benefits, demonstrated training and development
opportunities, employee health and safety policies, basic and industry-specific
safety training, demonstrated safety management systems, and a positive safety
performance record.
Environment
Covers a company’s interactions with the environment at large, including use of
natural resources, and a company’s impact on the Earth’s ecosystems. The category
evaluates corporate environmental performance, compliance with environmental
regulations, mitigation of environmental footprint, leadership in addressing climate
change through appropriate policies and strategies, energy-efficient operations, and
the development of renewable energy and other alternative environmental
technologies, disclosure of sources of environmental risk and liability and actions
to minimize exposure to future risk, implementation of natural resource
conservation and efficiency programs, pollution prevention programs,
demonstration of a strategy toward sustainable development, integration of
environmental sustainability and responsiveness with management and the board,
and programs to measure and engage stakeholders for environmental improvement.
Source: CSRHub (https://www.csrhub.com/content/csrhub-data-schema/)
Communities
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Table 1
Matched sample descriptive statistics

OVR
COM
EMP
ENV
WEDGE
ROA
SLACK
SIZE
AGE
TOBINQ
LEVERAGE
VOLATILITY

N
737
737
737
737
737
737
737
737
737
737
737
737

Std. Dev.
9.122
10.058
9.776
11.376
1.303
0.118
0.206
1.443
13.950
1.095
0.223
0.055

Dual-class Sample
Min.
25th Pct. 50th Pct.
25.167
46.167
53.000
21.500
45.000
53.000
24.000
46.333
53.000
18.000
44.667
53.333
1.000
1.677
2.553
-1.384
0.012
0.040
-0.190
0.095
0.225
2.602
6.598
7.505
1.000
7.000
17.000
0.020
0.383
0.684
0.000
0.054
0.173
0.025
0.068
0.093

75th Pct.
58.667
59.000
60.000
59.667
3.672
0.077
0.384
8.539
29.000
0.684
0.333
0.121

Max.
74.250
79.000
74.667
83.000
5.272
0.299
0.855
11.408
60.000
9.804
1.332
0.677

Mean
52.549
52.143
52.954
52.266
2.745
0.029
0.254
7.572
19.163
1.288
0.230
0.103

Single-class Sample
N
Mean
737
54.467
737
53.903
737
55.024
737
51.884
737
1.000
737
0.029
737
0.190
737
7.585
737
19.722
737
1.305
737
0.289
737
0.108

Mean Difference
t-stat
-4.25a
-3.45a
-4.26a
0.64
36.10a
-0.11
6.00a
-.17
-0.74
-4.49a
-5.17a
-1.80c

OVR is the overall CSR score computed as the mean of COM, EMP, and ENV. COM is the CSR communities score, EMP is the CSR employees score, and ENV is
the CSR environment score, all sourced from CSRHub (see Appendix for more information); WEDGE is excess insider control measured as the ratio of insider voting
rights to insider cash flow rights; ROA is return on assets, defined as income before extraordinary items divided by total assets; SLACK is current assets less current
liabilities scaled by total assets; SIZE is the natural log of total assets; AGE is firm age in years, where years represents the length of time a firm has been publicly
listed per CRSP; LEVERAGE is calculated as the sum of current and long-term debt divided by total assets; TOBINQ is Tobin’s Q, calculated as the market value of
equity plus total debt divided by total assets; VOLATILITY is the standard deviation of the trailing twelve-month stock returns. Letters a, b, and c denote significance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-sided tests).
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Table 2
Regression Results – Test of excess insider control on overall CSR scores
Column
Sample
Regression
Dependent Variable
Intercept
DC

A
Matched
OLS
OVR
58.49a
(21.93)
-2.44a
(-4.56)

B
Matched
OLS
OVR
57.45a
(21.99)
-0.74a
(-3.55)

WEDGE
WEDGE_RANK
ROA
SLACK
SIZE
AGE
TOBINQ
LEVERAGE
VOLATILITY
N
Adj. R2

C
Matched
OLS
OVR
59.96a
(22.06)

-2.11
(-0.78)
1.04
(0.58)
-0.39
(-1.57)
0.01
(0.18)
-0.70a
(-2.72)
-2.86b
(-2.23)
-2.51
(-0.62)
1,474
32.16%

-1.78
(-0.69)
0.62
(0.35)
-0.37
(-1.42)
0.01
(0.70)
-0.55b
(-2.15)
-2.65b
(-2.02)
-1.71
(-0.41)
1,474
31.38%

D
Matched
2SLS
OVR
72.49a
(9.39)
-15.13b
(-2.09)

-0.48a
(-4.44)
-1.78
(-0.66)
1.07
(0.59)
-0.35
(-1.40)
0.01
(0.43)
-0.73a
(-2.81)
-3.19b
(-2.46)
-1.79
(-0.44)
1,474
32.18%

-1.87
(-0.73)
0.69
(0.35)
-0.15
(-0.50)
0.02
(0.76)
-0.50c
(-1.92)
-2.89b
(-2.08)
-1.43
(-0.34)
1,474
30.78%

Reported are results of ordinary least squares (OLS) or two-stage least squares (2SLS) regressions as indicated where test
statistics and significance levels are calculated based on standard errors (Rogers) clustered at the firm level. All regressions
include year and Fama and French (1997) industry indicator variables. OVR is the overall CSR score computed as the mean
of COM, EMP, and ENV. COM is the CSR communities score, EMP is the CSR employees score, and ENV is the CSR
environment score, all sourced from CSRHub, see Appendix for more information; DC is an indicator variable taking a
value of one for observations that are dual-class (zero otherwise); WEDGE is the ratio of insider voting rights to insider
cash flow rights; ROA is return on assets, defined as income before extraordinary items divided by total assets; SLACK is
current assets less current liabilities scaled by total assets; SIZE is the natural log of total assets; AGE is firm age in years,
where years represents the length of time a firm has been publicly listed per CRSP; LEVERAGE is calculated as the sum of
current and long-term debt divided by total assets; TOBINQ is Tobin’s Q, calculated as the market value of equity plus total
debt divided by total assets; VOLATILITY is the standard deviation of the trailing twelve-month stock returns. Letters a, b,
and c denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-sided tests). t-statistic in parentheses.
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Table 3
Regression Results – Test of excess insider control on specific CSR dimensions
Panel
Sample
Dependent Variable
Intercept
DC

Matched
COM
62.01a
(19.24)
-2.21a
(-3.70)

A
Matched
EMP
54.99a
(16.78)
-2.65a
(-4.52)

Matched
ENV
42.23a
(14.70)
-0.18
(-0.25)

WEDGE
ROA
SLACK
SIZE
AGE
TOBINQ
LEVERAGE
VOLATILITY
N
Adj. R2

-0.14
(-0.05)
0.68
(0.34)
-1.07a
(-3.83)
0.01
(0.42)
-0.75b
(-2.57)
-1.87
(-1.27)
-4.02
(-0.84)
1,474
30.43%

-4.28
(-1.49)
1.35
(0.71)
0.28
(1.02)
-0.01
(-0.07)
-0.63b
(-2.21)
-3.89a
(-2.65)
-0.74
(-0.17)
1,474
26.12%

-4.47
(-1.24)
1.62
(0.73)
-0.05
(-0.18)
0.01
(0.08)
-0.77b
(-2.39)
-2.43
(-1.44)
-1.39
(-0.21)
1,474
25.09%

Matched
COM
61.03a
(20.74)

B
Matched
EMP
53.89a
(15.49)

Matched
ENV
42.07a
(14.89)

-0.61a
(-2.59)
0.14
(0.05)
0.20
(0.10)
-1.05a
(-3.69)
0.02
(0.81)
-0.61b
(-2.07)
-1.62
(1.08)
-3.24
(-0.66)
1,474
29.81%

-0.85a
(-3.64)
-3.91
(-1.43)
0.98
(0.50)
0.31
(1.10)
0.01
(0.48)
-0.49
(-1.70)
-3.71b
(-2.49)
0.09
(0.02)
1,474
25.45%

0.10
(0.37)
-4.48
(-1.25)
1.33
(0.60)
-0.07
(-0.23)
0.01
(0.07)
-0.73b
(-2.32)
-2.27
(-1.33)
-1.18
(-0.18)
1,474
25.09%

Reported are results of ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions where test statistics and significance levels are calculated based on standard errors (Rogers) clustered
at the firm level. All regressions include year and Fama and French (1997) industry indicator variables. COM is the CSR communities score, EMP is the CSR
employees score, and ENV is the CSR environment score, all sourced from CSRHub (see Appendix for more information); DC is an indicator variable taking a value
of one for observations that are dual-class (zero otherwise); WEDGE is the ratio of insider voting rights to insider cash flow rights; ROA is return on assets, defined
as income before extraordinary items divided by total assets; SLACK is current assets less current liabilities scaled by total assets; SIZE is the natural log of total
assets; AGE is firm age in years, where years represents the length of time a firm has been publicly listed per CRSP; LEVERAGE is calculated as the sum of current
and long-term debt divided by total assets; TOBINQ is Tobin’s Q, calculated as the market value of equity plus total debt divided by total assets; VOLATILITY is the
standard deviation of the trailing twelve-month stock returns. Letters a, b, and c denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-sided tests). tstatistic in parentheses.
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Table 4
Regression Results – Test of resource availability on the excess insider control-CSR relationship
Column
Sample
Regression
Dependent Variable
Intercept
WEDGE
WEDGE x CCE_TQUAR

A
Matched
OLS
OVR
57.89a
(22.30)
-0.93a
(-4.01)
0.71c
(1.70)

B
Matched
OLS
OVR
58.51a
(22.84)
-0.86a
(-4.00)

C
Matched
OLS
OVR
58.31a
(22.19)
-0.97a
(-4.40)

D
Matched
OLS
OVR
57.82a
(22.37)
-0.86a
(-4.14)

E
Matched
OLS
OVR
57.79a
(22.32)
-0.87a
(-4.02)

0.96c
(1.81)

WEDGE x CCE_TDEC

1.16b
(2.55)

WEDGE x OCF_TQUAR

1.34b
(2.11)

WEDGE x OCF_TDEC
WEDGE x FCF_TQUAR

0.54
(1.26)
1.63a
(3.02)

WEDGE x FCF_TDEC
CCE_TQUAR

-1.14
(-1.02)

CCE_TDEC

0.96
(0.59)
-1.90b
(-1.97)

OCF_TQUAR

-3.02b
(-2.08)

OCF_TDEC
FCF_TQUAR

-0.80
(-0.76)

FCF_TDEC
Controls
N
Adj. R2

F
Matched
OLS
OVR
58.01a
(22.23)
-0.92a
(-4.30)

Included
1,474
31.49%

Included
1,474
32.14%

Included
1,474
31.72%

Included
1,474
31.62%

Included
1,474
31.40%

-3.67b
(2.52)
Included
1,474
31.85%

Reported are results of ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions as indicated where test statistics and significance levels
are calculated based on standard errors (Rogers) clustered at the firm level. All regressions include year and Fama and
French (1997) industry indicator variables. Z_TQUAR (Z_TDEC) is an indicator variable that takes a value of one (zero
otherwise) for observations in the top quartile (decile) of the following Z partitioning variables: CCE, the ratio of cash
and cash equivalents to total assets; OCF, the ratio of operating cash flow to total assets; and FCF, the ratio of free cash
flow to total assets, where free cash flow is defined as OCF less capital expenditures. Other variables defined in Table
1. Letters a, b, and c denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-sided tests). t-statistic in
parentheses.
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Table 5
Regression Results – Test of excess insider control on CSR performance sourced from MSCI ESG STATS database
Panel
Sample
Dependent Variable
Intercept
DC

Matched
STR
-1.93a
(-6.64)
-0.11a
(-2.66)

A
Matched
CON
0.13
(1.60)
-0.01
(-0.04)

Matched
NET
-2.03a
(-7.98)
-0.11a
(-2.70)

WEDGE
ROA
SLACK
SIZE
AGE
TOBINQ
LEVERAGE
VOLATILITY
N
Adj. R2

-0.32b
(-2.28)
0.32a
(2.60)
0.27a
(11.96)
0.00
(1.35)
0.10a
(4.84)
-0.22b
(-2.25)
0.09
(0.34)
1,524
31.75%

-0.01
(-0.27)
0.01
(0.06)
0.00
(0.30)
-0.00
(-0.54)
0.00
(0.59)
0.06c
(1.90)
0.22b
(2.19)
1,524
36.87%

-0.28b
(-2.06)
0.32a
(2.63)
0.26a
(11.93)
0.01
(1.29)
0.09a
(4.51)
-0.27a
(-2.62)
-0.10
(-0.35)
1,524
29.92%

Matched
STR
-1.96a
(-6.56)
-0.04b
(-1.98)
-0.30b
(-2.08)
0.32b
(2.55)
0.27a
(11.98)
0.01
(1.58)
0.10a
(4.87)
-0.23b
(-2.24)
0.11
(0.40)
1,524
31.51%

B
Matched
CON
0.13
(1.56)

Matched
NET
-2.05a
(-7.99)

0.01
(0.80)
-0.01
(-0.25)
-0.01
(-0.15)
0.00
(0.21)
-0.00
(-0.61)
0.00
(0.75)
0.07b
(2.01)
0.22b
(2.19)
1,524
36.92%

-0.05b
(-2.29)
-0.27b
(-1.89)
0.33a
(2.64)
0.26a
(12.03)
0.00
(1.53)
0.10a
(4.54)
-0.27a
(-2.65)
-0.08
(-0.29)
1,524
29.77%

Reported are results of ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions where test statistics and significance levels are calculated based on standard errors (Rogers) clustered
at the firm level. All regressions include year and Fama and French (1997) industry indicator variables. STR and CON represent the number of CSR strengths and
concerns summed across the communities, employees, environment, and diversity dimensions as reported in the MSCI ESG STATS dataset in total, adjusted per
Deng et al. (2013); NET is STR – CON; DC is an indicator variable taking a value of one for observations that are dual-class (zero otherwise); WEDGE is the ratio
of insider voting rights to insider cash flow rights; ROA is return on assets, defined as income before extraordinary items divided by total assets; SLACK is current
assets less current liabilities scaled by total assets; SIZE is the natural log of total assets; AGE is firm age in years, where years represents the length of time a firm
has been publicly listed per CRSP; LEVERAGE is calculated as the sum of current and long-term debt divided by total assets; TOBINQ is Tobin’s Q, calculated as
the market value of equity plus total debt divided by total assets; VOLATILITY is the standard deviation of the trailing twelve-month stock returns. Letters a, b, and
c denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-sided tests). t-statistic in parentheses.
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